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3INTRODUCTION
European foreign policy: the words do not conjure up any grand images. In the
absence of any real ambition, there are neither triumphs to celebrate nor disas-
ters to mourn. There is only gentle irrelevance to contemplate. Such is the image
of Europe as an international player today in the minds of those who make and
study foreign policy and strategy, in our own as well as in foreign capitals.
Gentle irrelevance, for Europe proclaims to wish the world well and is generous
enough with its money to prove it. And it presents no cause for fear, only for
irritation, in some corners, with its inconvenient insistence on universal values.
But irrelevance nonetheless, for Europe lacks the unity and sense of purpose for
resolute and sustained action to uphold these values, and continues to liberally
spend its money quite regardless of values or effect. Increasingly irrelevant even,
for in the wake of the financial crisis Europe struggles to maintain its own social
model, which undermines the legitimacy of its value-based narrative and erodes
the will as well as the means for external action.
Even if the image was false (and alas it is not, at least not entirely), because of it
Europe is treated with benign neglect, by those that take our money, by our
supposed “strategic partners” among the emerging powers, and even by our
allies. All of them go through the motions of meetings and summits without
really considering Europe a force to be taken into account. Many have been
quick to exploit the absence of purposive action on our side to occupy the
ground (the seas, the resources, the hearts and minds…) that we have aban-
doned or not cared to occupy. Europe, in sum, is not perceived and therefore not
treated as a strategic actor, as a pole of the multipolar world, as one of the great
powers.
And yet there is ground for optimism, because this unsettling story is mostly of
Europe’s own making. The emerging powers are emerging and the world has
become multipolar, so Europe’s relative weight has declined. But its absolute
weight in world politics could be much greater. The story could still have a
happy end, if only the governments of Europe would see through the seven falla-
cies that stop them from being the player that collectively they could be.
Sven Biscop1
1. Prof. Dr. Sven Biscop is Director of the Europe in the World Programme at the Egmont – Royal Insti-
tute for International Relations in Brussels, and teaches at Ghent University and at the College of Europe
in Bruges. He has written many stories, but sincerely hopes that one day some of them may come true.
The author thanks Brigadier-General (Ret.) Jo Coelmont (Egmont) as well as Daniel Fiott, Prof. Dr. Alex-
ander Mattelaer and Prof. Dr. Luis Simón (all at the Institute for European Studies at the Vrije Universiteit
Brussel) for their help in telling the tale.

5THE DWARFS
There are only two kinds of countries in Europe, Belgian statesman Paul-Henri
Spaak is reputed to have said: small countries and those that have yet to realize
that they are but that – small countries. Alas, the latter far outnumber the
former. To believe that on the world stage any European state is more than a
dwarf is the single most damning fallacy for Europe’s global role, for it creates
the illusion in many capitals that they don’t need the other Europeans.
It particularly stimulates bilateral wheeling and dealing with the great powers to
the detriment of collective European engagement, seen as no more than a
secondary supplement to national foreign policy. It creates a competition
between Europeans to appear the most attractive to investment by and trade
with the great powers; in practice that often translates as being the most
compliant. Divide et impera: Europeans divide themselves and the great powers
rule. For the great powers would not long remain great powers without a certain
degree of cunning: of course they play off one European against the other, since
we offer them the opportunity on a silver platter. We even go to the extent of
acting collectively to undermine our collective institutions: since 2012 e.g. we
have allowed for the emergence of a separate diplomatic track between China
and Central and Eastern Europe. What the 16 European states involved stand
to gain, apart from the fleeting illusion of importance, is not quite clear – that
China stands to gain from this arrangement need not be doubted for a moment.
This fallacy is understandable, for some dwarfs do carry a big sword or a big
purse. But dwarfs being dwarfs, it is either/or: no single European state today
can claim global reach in all dimensions of power, military, economic, and polit-
ical. Therefore no single European state can defend all of its interests on its own
all of the time. Surely no European country assumes it can deal alone with all
the ramifications of the Arab Spring, to name but the obvious example. None
has the military clout: Britain and France could initiate the interventions in
Libya and Mali (and deserve our appreciation for it) but could not see them
through without assistance from the US and other Europeans. Nor does any
European government have the financial means.
The conclusion is obvious: because some threats and challenges are just too big
to face alone, in many instances defending the national interest demands collec-
tive action. Then why don’t we do it?

7SNOW WHITE
To convince the Member States of the need for collective action through the EU,
the Union must prove it can more effectively defend those interests which its
Member States individually can no longer safeguard. Unfortunately, many offi-
cials and observers still seem to regard interests as a notion that does not or
should not apply to the EU. The pursuit of interests runs contrary to their ideal-
ised view of an altruistic EU foreign policy. This is the attitude that leads some
to condemn the interventions in Libya and Mali for the mere fact that they
served our interests. One wonders whether these critics think any government
would put its soldiers at risk when they have no interest at all in the matter, and
whether they don’t think that the people of Libya and Mali feel that the inter-
ventions at the same time were very much in their interest too. They accept that
states have national interests, of course, and that the Commission’s DG Trade
defends interests is somehow acceptable too. But the EU’s Common Foreign and
Security Policy in this view exists solely to do good in the world: the EU as Snow
White, pure, innocent – and helpless.
A fallacy, for Union should create strength, not weakness. L’Union fait la force:
not all Belgians may feel that their Kingdom’s motto does or should apply to the
country, but it certainly applies to Europe.
Fortunately, attitudes are evolving. The EU’s anti-piracy operation, Atalanta,
e.g. was always publicly motivated by a desire to assist the people of Somalia –
a laudable purpose of course – while referring to the protection of European
trade initially was “not done”, as if the one excludes the other. Today however,
EU officials proudly refer to Atalanta as the first military operation under the
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) that clearly is about European
interests – evidence that “we can do it too”. At the December 2012 meeting of
the European Council, the Heads of State and Government noted that “in
today’s changing world the European Union is called upon to assume increased
responsibilities in the maintenance of international peace and security in order
to guarantee the security of its citizens and the promotion of its interests
[emphasis added]”. In her Final Report Preparing the December 2013 European
Council on Security and Defence (15 October 2013), the High Representative
called for a Union able “to act decisively as a security provider”, “autonomously
where necessary”, and “to protect its interests”, including even by “projecting
power” – certainly the first time that last notion was mentioned in an EU docu-
ment.
Foreign policy is about interests. The recognition at the EU level that that simple
fact is neither good nor bad is the first step toward a Union of strength. It is the
way these interests are then pursued that can be “good” or “bad” and indeed
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requires close scrutiny. Sometimes the “good” way will require the use force,
though. Let us not forget that our vital interests include upholding the core of
international law, notably the illegality of war and the “Responsibility to
Protect” people from genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against
humanity. In such situations, civilian power alone quickly leaves you powerless,
for power is the result of a multiplication of factors: if one factor (military,
economic or political/civilian) equals zero, the end result equals zero too.2
Rather than Snow White therefore, perhaps Joan of Arc is a better image, if one
is called for.
Of course force should remain the last resort. But a Union that is never willing
to apply force under its own flag will never be a credible platform for collective
action to those of its members that have a strong strategic culture.
2. To paraphrase my colleague at Egmont, Jo Coelmont.
9THE APPLE
If European foreign policy is about interests, more is called for than going
around the world handing out free apples in return for a token commitment to
human rights and democracy. It is another fallacy to equate foreign policy with
doing programmes and projects. Too many EU “policy” decisions amount to
extending or adding to existing budget lines, without setting clear objectives or
even assessing the effectiveness of past programmes. European foreign policy is
not political enough.
Our response to the turmoil in our southern neighbourhood that followed the
Arab Spring is a prime example. What the EU has called “More for More” in
reality amounts to more of the same: extra money has been allocated to the
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), but without reassessing its objectives
and instruments. Why would a policy that did not yield results in the seven years
before the Arab Spring, all of a sudden work now? The additional money defi-
nitely is not enough to make a difference: one cannot go to Cairo with a few
€100 million and announce that one will take the country in hand. For one,
Saudi Arabia would just add another zero to that amount. The economic chal-
lenge is obvious, but it is beyond Europe’s means to address it in one fell swoop
– “A Marshall Plan here and a Marshall Plan there and soon you’re talking
about real money”.3
In any case, more money will not generate more effect if the way it is used
remains unaltered. Conditionality – handing out apples to the good pupils – is
less and less effective. Other actors, like China, have a huge apple basket too, so
our relative leverage declines. More importantly, this basically paternalistic
approach is no longer in touch with the times. Particularly in countries where
people have just taken their fate into their own hands, like in Tunisia, Egypt and
Libya, they now want to craft their own model, rather than passively adopting
a model from the outside, be it from Europe or elsewhere.
In our desire to be liked by everybody, like Snow White, we have declared part-
nership with just about everybody, with the emerging powers, with all of our
neighbours, and many more, promising them apples if they would only become
like us: democratic social market economies that guarantee the security, pros-
perity, freedom and equality of their citizens. In practice, by formally accepting
regimes as partners even before they changed, we have taken away much of the
incentive for change and reduced our own freedom of action. For once partner-
ship has been announced, it is difficult for us to keep our distance and be very
critical – Snow White is not the one to be strict and cut off the apple supply
3. Steve Coll, “Hard on Obama”. In: The New York Review of Books, Vol. 60, 2013, No. 12.
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when necessary. As a result, rather than changing our partners, the whole notion
of partnership has been tainted by the inclusion of unsavoury regimes which in
the public eye became our friends. The apple has proved to be poisonous:
neither the one that gave it nor the one that accepted it is much the better for it.
Time to abandon programmes and partnerships and return to diplomacy. Part-
nership is for those with whom we do share respect for the same universal values
on which our own model of society is based and therefore can systematically
engage in joint action. With others, we have diplomatic relations that allow for
a dialogue and, if that is successful, occasional cooperation on specific issues.
We are good at diplomacy, actually. The High Representative, Catherine
Ashton, is the only person apart from his family who managed to speak with
Morsi after the army had deposed him as president of Egypt. Her mediation
efforts, in concert with the US, did not prevent the outbreak of armed clashes in
the end, but it does demonstrate that the potential is there.
11
THE WITCH
Once again the question can be asked why then the Union does not live up to its
potential? If misfortune befalls Snow White, we blame the witch. But this is
another fallacy: it is all too easy to blame someone else for the ineffectiveness of
EU foreign policy, but in the end most of the blame lies with the Member States
themselves, who are not willing to let the EU level play the role that it could play.
The programmatic approach to foreign policy is often decried as the result of the
dominance of the ways of the Commission within the European External Action
Service. But if that is to some extent true, it only holds sway because too many
Member States are too exclusively focused on their national foreign policies and
do not sufficiently use the collective EU instruments and institutions (that they
have themselves created). “More for More”, to stay with the same example, is
too programmatic by far, but it also quite surprising that no Member States
seem to push for a really new policy towards our southern neighbours, or even
just for a real reassessment of the ENP.
Blaming the High Representative for the lack of success of EU external action
has become a favourite Brussels pastime; this author must admit to having
joined the chorus of criticism on more than one occasion, notably because of the
absence of strategic debate and lack of prioritization and initiative. But Kiss-
inger himself, for all his criticism of Europe, would not be able to take any grand
initiative if confronted with a fronde of unable and unwilling Presidents and
Ministers, who are concerned more with the prestige that national policies can
bring than with the ineffectiveness resulting from a lack of European policies.
He had to deal with only one Nixon, after all.
Finally, if all else fails, we can always blame the Chinese or, depending on the
dossier, the Russians, for the absence of success. But while they do often under-
mine our policy, we forget that we make it all too easy for them to do so if we
are too divided to devise an unambiguous policy ourselves. In the field, resolute
strategy usually wins out over wishy-washy presence.
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THE PRINCE
More important than shouldering (much of) the blame, is assuming responsi-
bility. Member States will have to assume a lot more responsibility, for what was
the bedrock of European strategic thinking has now also become a fallacy: we
can no longer count on our prince from America to save us from each and every
danger. Not that the prince does not care for us anymore: if once again the
territory of Europe itself were directly threatened, he would charge to the rescue,
because that directly concerns American vital interests. But absent such a threat,
the real focus of US strategy is now on Asia and the Pacific. Princes have a thing
with dragons after all – fair maidens like Snow White tend to get boring if a
maiden they intend to stay. Consequently, in case of crises in our broad neigh-
bourhood Washington expects Europe to take the initiative and respond with its
own means, at an early stage, with US support in specific areas (notably intelli-
gence), in order to prevent escalation and the drawing in of more substantial US
assets.
US action in recent crises in Europe’s southern periphery bears out the reality of
this “pivot”, not so much of American military assets (most US combat troops
had already been redeployed) but of the focus of American strategy. The inter-
vention in Libya in 2011 was still more of an American operation in a European
guise. Europeans for the greater part had to rely on American strategic enablers
(precision guided munitions, air-to-air refuelling, intelligence) without which
they would have faced great difficulties to run such an air campaign, but Euro-
peans initiated and had to convince the US of the need of the intervention –
usually it’s the other way around. And the American message afterwards was
clear: Europeans ought to be able to wage such an after all limited campaign, on
their doorstep, alone – one can hardly disagree. The 2012 intervention in Mali
conformed much more with American expectations: Europeans initiated an
intervention and saw it through with US involvement largely limited to intelli-
gence. Even the major US role in addressing the civil war in Syria today testifies
to the reality of the “pivot”, because it is a role which it didn’t seek. When
President Barack Obama declared the use of chemical weapons to be a red line
beyond which the US could not remain inactive, this was a polite way of saying
that the US was not going to get involved in the conflict, since the calculation in
Washington clearly was that nobody would be foolish enough to cross this line.
Alas, once a red line is drawn, one can always count on someone to step over it;
hence the US was drawn in against its intention.
The implication is clear: those European governments that are still denying the
reality of the shift in American strategy, intimating that we have seen and heard
it all before, are engaging in a dangerous exercise of wishful thinking. “Before”
was during the Cold War, when the European front in any case was central to
EUROPE AND THE WORLD OR SNOW WHITE AND THE SEVEN FALLACIES
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US strategy; today the US sees China as its most important strategic competitor.
Europeans may be justified in preferring not to think in such terms – designating
enemies can easily become a self-fulfilling prophecy – but cannot escape the
consequences: we will sometimes be on our own. Denial of this unpleasant (but
entirely logical) fact of life is not going to help us prepare for it.
Unfortunately, neither of the recent crises has really been addressed by Europe
collectively. In Libya and Mali, intervention was initiated and implemented by
ad hoc coalitions; the EU came in only afterwards. EU sanctions have been
imposed on Syria, but at heart Member States differ decisively about the way to
deal with the war: arming or at least otherwise supporting the forces of the
opposition, in order to safeguard influence after the hoped for fall of the Assad
regime, or continuing to sit the fence, for fear of handing power to jihadist
elements now dominant in the very much divided rebel camp. In all three cases,
Britain and/or France are at the core of (attempts to create) ad hoc coalitions
that undertake a “European” action, which after the facts inevitably draw in the
EU, which alone has the instruments and means for post-intervention stabilisa-
tion. This is not a viable model for the long term. On the one hand, neither
Britain nor France can seriously hope to supplant US power and always bear the
greatest share of the burden of European military action – they simply no longer
have the means. On the other hand, a Union in which Paris and London peren-
nially decide when and where to intervene, while the other Member States can
decide to join or to abstain but don’t have real influence on French and British
decision-making (just like Europe as a whole has little impact on American deci-
sions of war and peace) is not tenable.
The same conclusion is evident once again: collective action under the political
aegis of the EU, guided by a focus on interests, is the only viable option. Soon
enough, the choice will no longer be between national or collective action, but
between collective action or no action at all.
15
THE CASTLE
The prince’s pivot exposes yet another fallacy: the CSDP and NATO are not
competing castles in the same shire that should therefore be jockeying for influ-
ence – they are but wings of one and the same castle that defends the shire as a
whole. Unfortunately, a fallacious focus on institutions has generated a reduc-
tionism that is detrimental to the quality of the European strategic debate.
Nearly every issue is automatically reduced to the question of the desired
competences and prestige of the preferred organisation. Falsely perceived as a
zero-sum game, it has led to a ridiculous beauty contest between NATO and the
CSDP. Fighting Somali pirates? Europeans deploy on two separate operations.
Joining capability development efforts? Europeans engage in two separate
schemes, Pooling & Sharing and Smart Defence. European governments are
perfectly capable, furthermore, of defending contradictory positions on one and
the same issue depending on whether they sit in a NATO or an EU meeting.
Mirror, mirror on the wall, which is the mightiest security organisation of them
all?4
At a stroke, the US pivot has rendered this debate entirely obsolete. It is often
presented as if the EU is divided but fortunately NATO at least always has a
clear strategy and the will to act. In fact, the US usually has a strategy which it
then, because the Europeans are indeed divided, imposes on NATO. But the US
will not take the lead anymore in responding to crises in the European
periphery; they expect us to take the lead and initiate a response. Without the
preponderant US lead, NATO is nothing more, politically speaking, than that
same quarrelling bunch of Europeans that also makes up the EU. The question
is not therefore whether in a given crisis it is up to NATO or the CSDP to act,
but whether Europeans will act. If they do, they will make use of NATO, or the
CSDP, or other EU instruments, or, most likely, a combination thereof – the
specific circumstances of each contingency will determine which instruments are
apt and available to be put to use. If they don’t, then nobody will make use of
any of these, including NATO, whose great asset, its command and control
structure, will just be sitting idle.
Whether we act through NATO or the CSDP, “we” in an increasing number of
cases is likely to mean “we Europeans”. Trying to design a strict division of
labour between NATO and the CSDP is a futile exercise therefore, because they
are but instruments. One doesn’t lay down in elaborate detail which compe-
tences one accords to the different tools in a toolbox – rather one tries to have
as comprehensive a toolbox as possible and select the right combination of tools
from it in function of the problem that needs solving.
4. Credit for this image must go to Alexander Mattelaer, who clearly caught the author’s vibe.
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There are many instruments available in NATO, the CSDP, as well as in other
parts of the EU, in the UN and at the national level, but there is only one Europe
to serve. Logically, Europe ought to have one view on which instruments it needs
and what it expects them to be able to do. Specifically, Europeans cannot have
one view on intervention and the use of force when they meet in the EU and
another when they meet in NATO. The President of the European Council,
Herman Van Rompuy, tried to steer Europe in the right direction when in 2012
he called for a debate among the Heads of State and Government (to be held in
December 2013), not about the CSDP, but about “the state of defence in
Europe”. The crucial question to be answered, which has become rather urgent
because of the US pivot, is: which responsibilities is Europe willing to assume as
a security provider, regardless of whether in a specific case it will act through the
CSDP or NATO or both. The problem is that there is today no recognized forum
where Europeans can meet and take decisions about their role in security and
defence in both NATO and the EU – it’s always either/or. The preparation of the
December 2013 European Council proves how difficult it is to overcome the
reductionist fallacy: even though Van Rompuy wanted it to be about “the state
of defence in Europe”, it was then prepared via the usual channels, i.e. EU chan-
nels, and thus risks ending up to be just about the CSDP after all.
The European Council is an EU body, of course, but they are our Heads of State
and Government, meeting in an intergovernmental context, adopting not
binding law but political declarations. Surely they can agree to state explicitly
that they will regard their conclusions as political guidance for their govern-
ments’ positions in both the EU and NATO. But before they can agree on
anything, they need to have a thorough substantial debate. Dare one say: a stra-
tegic debate?
17
THE FAIRY TALE
This brings us neatly to the last fallacy: European governments will not be able
to overcome any of these fallacies if they continue to refuse to engage in the
strategic debate. Precisely because they are so divided today, they need a fairy
tale, a story-line, a narrative, to tie it all together and stipulate what it is that
they want to do together: a strategy.
Europeans do not have to do everything together. The aim is not to upload
everything to the collective European agenda. The point of strategy is precisely
the opposite: it is to make choices, to set priorities. What we don’t need is a
compilation of all the priorities of all of our national foreign policies; that would
yield a Christmas tree but not a strategy that can be acted upon. Nor is there a
need to say a little something about every imaginable subject of EU external
action; we have www.europa.eu for that. An EU strategy for foreign policy or
external action is to focus on a short list of key priorities, which all 28 Member
States see as priorities, and on which collective action brings the greatest added
value because none of the 28 can see them through on its own. Guiding all of
our collective external action for every 5-year legislature (and term of office of
the High Representative), this would be grand strategy – grand enough to also
guide European positions in and on NATO when we use that instrument.
Europe may not be widely seen as a strategic actor, but most people in the world
do agree that Europe is a good place to live. That points us to what Europe has
achieved: through a unique combination of democracy, capitalism and “big
government”, it has created a much more equal society than can be found in
most other places around the world, which provides the greatest security, pros-
perity and freedom to the greatest number of its citizens. But not yet to all of its
citizens, so although this aspiration to equality is anchored in the Treaty on
European Union, an aspiration it remains. We must take great care that in our
eagerness to save the Euro, we don’t destroy the social model which the Euro
was meant to serve – not to threaten. It’s the social model that binds citizens to
the European idea, not the Euro: the intuition that even though one doesn’t quite
understand how it works, the EU is good for one’s wellbeing. We are in great
danger of arriving at the opposite: that people still don’t understand how the EU
works but they feel it threatens their wellbeing; in some Member States this may
already be the case.
The fairy tale does not start in a faraway land therefore, but has to start at home:
Europe has a great deal of work ahead to consolidate and then to deepen its
social model. At the same time, this internal strategic challenge is at the heart of
our external strategy. On the one hand, the conditions that have to be fulfilled
for Europe to achieve this, its fundamental purpose, constitute our vital inter-
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ests.5 The way to generate the priorities of our grand strategy for foreign policy
is to assess the global environment and identify the most important threats and
challenges to these shared vital interests. Foreign policy is about interests, as
stated above, but on the other hand, the European idea continues to shape the
way we pursue them: not as a zero-sum game, but in such a way that we don’t
harm the legitimate interests of others. The best way of achieving international
peace and security is to convince other governments to provide for the security,
prosperity and freedom of their citizens just as we provide for our own. We must
be willing to use coercion and the use of force, or the credible threat of it, but
only as a last resort.
The debate about the need to write a common fairy take risks becoming a never-
ending story, but fortunately a decision-point is in sight. When a new High
Representative enters office after the May 2014 European elections, he/she
should make this his/her first priority. Even if he/she would not be explicitly
mandated to do so by the European Council, he/she would still be well advised
to start the 5-year term with a clear set of priorities, in whichever form they are
written down: a European Global Strategy, a new European Security Strategy,
or maybe just a speech – but then a really good one.
5. Which I have defined elsewhere as: (1) preventing threats against Europe’s territory from materializing;
(2) keeping open all lines of interaction with the world, notably sea lanes and cyberspace; (3) assuring the
supply of energy and other natural resources; (4) managing migration, to maintain both a viable work
force and a viable social system; (5) mitigating the impact of climate change; (6) strengthening interna-
tional law as a fundament of international stability, notably the UN Charter and the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights; and (7) preserving the autonomy of decision-making by preventing undue
dependence on any foreign power. See “Peace without Money, War without Americans: Challenges for
European Strategy”. In: International Affairs, Vol. 89, 2013, No. 5, pp. 1125-1142.
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CONCLUSION
Common Foreign and Security Policy, Common Security and Defence Policy: as
with a Democratic Republic, the more the need is felt to explicitly stress it, the
less common/democratic it probably actually is. There is no magic wand that
will allow us to conjure up a European strategic consensus out of nowhere. But
there is no reason for pessimism either. Governments cling to their prerogatives,
but they are also pragmatic. We have seen in the wake of the Eurozone crisis that
in spite of the initial national reflex of many capitals, and reluctant though they
still may be, the agreed way out of the crisis is another step in European integra-
tion – a very big step even. The long-term trend toward ever closer Union thus
continues. Slowly, because most Member States will not think of Europeanising
an issue area until the moment when they have no other options left – but then
they will, including in foreign, security and defence policy. Perhaps quicker than
we might expect, given the enormous pressure on defence budgets today.
So, will they live happily ever after? The key is that in every fairy tale they live
happily ever after together.
